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SUMMARY 
The factors which affect the survival of human beings in airplane 
accidents followed by fire were studied by conducting full-scale crashes 
of transport- and cargo - type airplanes. Studies of burning airplane 
hulks supplemented the information obtained from the crash fires. The 
time interval during which occupants could escape from a burning air-
plane was determined by using the time histories of cabin temperatures 
and toxic gas concentrations in conjunction with data that define the 
environmental conditions which can be tolerated by human beings. Other 
hazardous factors, such as flying detached airplane parts, explosions, 
and crushing of the airplane structure} were also studied. 
INTRODUCTION 
The injuries and the fatalities resulting from aircraft accidents 
are the result of four general factors: impact decelerations, fire, 
structural miSSiles, and destruction of occupied compartments. Recent 
aeromedical research has shown that human beings can tolerate severe 
decelerative forces if adequately restrained and supported. The remain-
ing causes of death and injury must be studied if the hazard to occu-
pants during otherwise survivable accidents is to be reduced to an 
acceptable minimum . A limited study of these additional hazards was 
possible as part of the comprehensive full-scale crash fire research 
program being conducted by the NACA Lewis laboratory. The results of 
the study are presented in this report. 
The data presented were obtained by crashing instrumented full-
scale transport- or cargo-type airplanes in such a manner that a large 
fire resulted. Fires built around previously crashed but unburned air-
craft provided supplementary data. Time histories of the environmental 
temperatures and gas concentrations in the passenger and crew compart -
ments were obtained while the airplane was burning. The structural 
disintegration of the airplane and flying parts were recorded during 
the crash by motion-picture cameras . Additional information was 
obtained by a careful post - crash examination of the wreckage . 
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These data were used in conjunction with physiological tolerance 
criteria in order to determine the time interval during which an escape 
attempt could be made . This time interval, subsequently named the 
"escape time," gives an indication of the relative hazard imposed by 
each of the factors affecting survival in the fire. The "escape time" 
is considered to be more important than the interval during which people 
could be expected to survive inside the fuselage because occupants must 
escape through their own efforts in the majority of accidents. The data 
also indicate some means of either increasing the escape time or minimiz-
ing the hazard. 
The hazards assoc i ated with factors such as structural destruction 
and flying parts cannot be evaluated in terms ot an escape time. In 
these cases the hazard is described and possible remedial measures are 
discussed . 
CRASH PROCEDURE) EQUIPMENT, AND INSTRUMENTATION 
Two types of airplane normally used by the military services for 
both cargo and personnel transport were used for these studies. The 
first group of airplanes employed was of the low-midwing twin-engine 
type similar to twin-engine commercial transports. The second group was 
of the high-wing twin- engine packet type. All the airplanes used were 
supplied by the military services and were no longer of use· 
The studies were conducted by guiding an unmanned a irplane along a 
fixed path under its own power and allowing it to strike pre constructed 
barriers that damaged the propellers, engines, landing gear, and fuel 
tanks. The airplane was guided by slaving the fr ont landing wheel or 
wheels to a steel monorail placed in the center of a paved runway. This 
runway was long enough to allow the airplane to reach a speed of 85 to 
95 miles per hour) approximately take-off speed. Removal of the main 
landing wheels by the barriers caused the airplane to slide along the 
ground on its belly while the additional damage to propellers) engines, 
and fuel tanks created the conditions conducive to fire . The crashes 
therefore simulated a take - off accident in which the likelihood of 
serious fire was high but the structural damage was moderate . The out -
board fuel tanks were approximately three-fourths filled so that about 
1000 gallons of fuel were involved in each crash. The fuel used was 
either standard 100/130 grade aviation gasoline or a low volatility fuel 
having a Reid vapor pressure of 0.1 pound per square inch. Figures 1 to 
5 show various features of the crash site, crash operation, and damage 
inflicted on the airplane . 
The data were recorded by motion-picture cameras located around the 
crash- site perimeter and by instrumentation installed in a shock-mounted 
heat -resistant box in the airplane . A complete description of the 
facilities and methods used for the crashes is given in reference 1. 
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Since a ll the reQuired survival information concerning fire could 
not be obtained from the crashes) supplemental fire studies were made 
when necessary. Airplanes that did not burn when crashed were used for 
these studies. The major openings in the fuselage resulting from the 
crash were closed so that an essentially undamaged cabin was simulated. 
The fuel spillage on the ground and from the wing tanks was arranged to 
simulate that occurring in the full-scale crashes. Motion pictures of 
the cabin interior and airplane exterior were taken during the fire. 
Other supplemental studies were also made- The eQuipment used in 
these cases is described briefly in the discussion. 
Evaluation of the hazard associated with skin burning reQuired 
computation of the rate with which heat would be transmitted to the 
exposed skin of airplane occupants. The heat is transferred to the 
occupants by convection from the hot gases and by radiation from the hot 
fuselage walls. The heat that could be transferred to an occupant's 
skin was computed from the temperature histories of matte -black copper 
sphere calorimeters placed at passenger locations within the fuselage . 
These spheres were approximately the same diameter as a human head. 
Since the head is not protected by clothing and will be more rapidly 
affected than clothed parts) heat transfer to the head will govern the 
escape time. 
An airplane occupant exposed to a crash fire can also be injured 
by inhaling hot gases that enter the cabin) and can be poisoned by these 
same gases . These hazards were evaluated from time histories of the 
cabin atmosphere temperature and gaseous composition. 
The temperature of the cabin atmosphere was measured by thermo-
couples shielded from the heat radiated by hot fuselage walls. The 
atmosphere in the cabin and the pilot's compartment was sampled period-
ically during the fire and subseQuently analyzed. Carbon dioxide and 
oxygen concentrations were measured by the standard Orsat procedure. 
Carbon monoxide concentrations above 1 percent were also measured by 
the Orsat method. Smaller concentrations of carbon monoxide were meas-
ured by the Bureau of Standards colorimetric method (ref. 2). The 
estimate of aldehyde concentration was made by the sulfite -fuchsin 
colorimetric method. 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Thermal Injury 
Of the various injuries that result from the exposure of human 
beings to abnormal temperature conditions) only skin injury and respir-
atory system damage were considered in this study. For the short 
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intervals considered typical of crash fire circumstances ( less than 
15 min), other forms of thermal injur y , such as heat prostration, 
require heat s ource temperatures above those resulting in skin injury 
(fig . 3 of ref. 3) . 
Physiological criteria: skin injury . - On the basis of available 
physiological data, two criter i a can be established that will limit the 
escape time when an a irplane occupant's skin is exposed to heat . The 
first crit er ion is based upon the pain that is associated with the 
beginning of skin i nj ury and that can be tolerated by people; the second 
is based upon data defining t he thermal conditions that will inflict a 
second- degree b urn on exposed skin surfaces . 
studies of infrared r adi a tion on human skin (ref . 4) have shown 
that a skin surf ace temperature of 420 to 450 C ( 50 to 80 C above normal 
body temperature) is accompanied with "unbearable pain." This pain is 
sufficiently severe that, "According to lay reports, the feeling of 
facial pain may be str ong enough to delay one from taking pr eventive 
measures to escape t he fire" (ref . 4) . If environmental temperatures 
inside the fuselage during a cr ash fire rise until the occupants feel 
pain of this magnitude, further escape a ttempts on the part of some 
individuals can be compl etely di sor ganized by panic. 
The r elation between heat absorbed by the skin and the time during 
which absor ption occurs that causes unbearable pain is shown in fig-
ure 6 . This figure is a modification of figure 3 presented in refer-
ence 4 . 
An investigati on of thermal skin injury reported in reference 5 
showed that skin burning, injury to the ski n tissue, begins when the 
skin surface temperature is raised to 440 C (fig . 7). If this minimum 
skin surface temperature is maint ained) progressively more sever e injury 
occurs ) the extent of the injury depending upon the duration of the 
exposure . Below 440 C the r ate of cellular repair is equal to the rate 
of injury and no cumulative injury occurs. Because of the similar tem-
perature values for pain and the beginning of skin injury, pain is a 
good indication that skin injury will occur if the application of heat 
continues. A skin surface temper ature of 42 0 to 450 C (107.60 to 1130 F) 
can then be used as one criterion limiting the escape time. The method 
of determining this escape time is described in appendix A. 
Since some individuals can tolerate pain more readily than others 
without panic and could probably escape from a burning airplane even 
though exposed skin surfaces were severely burned, a second criterion 
for limiting the escape time is possible. This second criterion is 
based upon the combination of skin surface temperature and the duration 
of exposure to this temperature that produces a minimal second-degree 
burn. A minimal second-degree burn is one in which all cells in the 
__ J 
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epidermal layer have been killed by heat. The relation between skin 
surface temperature and exposure time causing a second-degree burn is 
shown by the solid line on figure 7. This figure shows that if the skin 
surface temperature is 440 C (1110 F), an exposure of about 6 hours is 
required to produce a second-degree burn . If the skin surface is main-
tained at 550 C (1310 F), an exposure of only 20 seconds is required for 
a second-degree burn; while at a skin surface temperature of 700 C 
(1580 F), a second-degree burn will be inflicted in 1 second. The infor-
mation presented in this figure makes possible the calculation of escape 
time as limited by a second -degree burn. With possible complicating 
f actors neglected, a second- degree burn of face , head, and neck is con-
sidered survivable by medical authorities. The escape times based upon 
this criterion will be presented for comparison with the escape times as 
limited by pain and the beginning of skin injury. The method of cal-
culating the second-degree burn escape time from a time history of 
calorimeter bulb temperature is also shown in appendix A. 
Physiological criteria: respiratory system injury . - Since airplane 
occupants may inhale hot gases that could inflict respiratory system 
injury, a tolerance criterion must be established for this hazard also. 
The results of studies reported in reference 6 show that the human 
body can tolerate ambient-air temperatures of 2400 F without injury for 
periods of over 20 minutes. These exposures included breathing the 
ambient atmosphere in the heated chamber. This reference also reports 
an industrial case in which an engineer entered drying equipment at 
3000 F protected by several burlap bags. In this case his body was 
protected by the insulating capacity of the burlap bags but no such pro-
tection was mentioned for the respiratory system. No injury resulted. 
A case of human exposure reported in reference 4 in which body and face 
were exposed to air at 3900 F for a short time resulted in only minor 
externa l burns a t points where evaporative cooling from skin perspiration 
could not occur. Examination of experimental animals whose respiratory 
systems were subjected to hot gases showed that air hot enough to burn 
the skin of the face can be inhaled without caUSing damage to the wind-
pipe or lungs (refs. 3 and 7). These data, however, do not indicate a 
sharply defined respiratory threshold temperature. Since the highest 
human respiratory system exposure without injury was 3900 F, this tem-
perature has been arbitrarily chosen as a threshold value to permit a 
gross comparison of the relative hazard of skin injury and respiratory 
damage. 
Temperature histories and associated escape times. - Histories of 
the ambient and calorimeter temperatures in passenger and crew compart-
ments during the various crashes together with the escape times a s deter-
mined by the criteria described in the previous paragraphs are shown on 
figure 8. The pain and second-degree-burn escape times are indicated by 
appropriate l abels. Pertinent data concerning type of a irplane, type of 
J 
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fuel, and wind velocity relative to the airplane are also included on 
each graph. For convenience in making comparisons from crash to crash, 
the escape times have also been tabulated in table I. 
These temperature histories represent the thermal conditions that 
resulted from crashes in which fire occurred on both sides of the air-
plane. In three of the four crashes large volumes of fuel mist formed 
when fuel tanks were ruptured while the airplane was moving rapidly 
(fig. 9). When this fuel mist was ignited while the airplane 'was sliding, 
large mist fires developed. Figure 10 shows the extent of such a mist 
fire. These mist fires burn away in 15 to 20 seconds, leaving fires 
burning from fuel on the ground, on the wetted airplane structure, and 
pouring from the tanks. The size and extent of these fires are shown by 
the upper photographs of figure 11. In from 2 to 5 minutes these fires 
subsequently develop to the size shown by the lower photographs on this 
same figure. 
Because the mist fires rise away from the airplane and also burn 
out in a few seconds, the air and calorimeter temperatures inside the 
fuselage do not increase. This effect is shown by inspection of the 
first 20 seconds of each temperature history (fig. 8). These cabin 
environment temperatures are not increased because the aluminum fuselage 
skin reflects most of the heat radiated by the fire; consequently, mist 
fires that touch the fuselage walls only momentarily while the airplane 
is sliding are not hazardous to the occupants. 
The escape times tabulated in the third column of table I show that 
skin injury was imminent in as little as 53 seconds in the fuselage 
of the airplane used for crash 6. The escape time based on the second-
degree-burn criterion, column 4, for the same airplane position is 
59 seconds. These data show that, for the high rate of temperature rise 
which occurred at this airplane location (12000 F/min) , there was a 
6-second difference in escape time as limited by pain and the inflicting 
of a second-degree burn. The intervals between the first feeling of pain 
and the inflicting of a second-degree burn for crashes 3 and 7, when the 
escape times are less than 100 seconds, are of the same order of magni-
tude as for the chosen example. It is apparent, therefore, that when a 
crash fire grows rapidly and the temperatures in occupied compartments 
rise with corresponding rapidity, little additional escape time can be 
gained beyond that indicated by the pain associated with the beginning 
of skin injury. 
The time after impact at which the ambient temperature in personnel 
compartments reached the respiratory system threshold temperature of 
3900 F is given in column 5 of table I. The minimum time in which the 
ambient temperature reached the respiratory threshold was 60 seconds and 
the maximum time was 296 seconds. These results show that, in general, 
the respiratory threshold was reached in approximately the same time as 
I 
___ ~~ ___ ---1 
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the skin burning threshold} 1 to 5 minutes. In one case (crash 6) 
pilot's compartment)} the respiratory threshold was reached prior to the 
skin burning threshold. In this instance} hot gases were being carried 
into the pilot's compartment by wind and convection inside the fuselage. 
This comparison of the skin injury and respiratory injury escape times 
indicates that the magnitude of the difference is insufficient to war-
rant considering One type of injury more important than the other. 
Because of the rapidly rising ambient -air temperatures this result is 
applicable even though the respiratory injury escape time would be longer 
if more complete data on humans had indicated a higher tolerance to the 
inhalation of hot gases. Remedial measures would thus be required for 
both types of injury if additional escape time is to be provided. 
The variation in escape time with position in a particular airplane 
during a fire and from one crash fire to another depends on the position 
of the passenger with respect to the main bulk of the fire, the wind 
direction and velocity, the area over which fuel is spilled during a 
crash, and the terrain on which the airplane comes to rest. The terrain 
determines where fuel will flow after it spills from the ruptured fuel 
tanks} which in turn determines where fire will be located with respect 
to the fuselage. The shorter escape times available in crash 3 as com-
pared with crash 1 are the result of wind speed, wind direction, and 
terrain. During crash 1 the wind was fairly brisk (14 mph) and from 
such a direction that it carried the flame away from the passenger com-
partment in the fuselage. The airplane also came to rest on level 
ground with the result that spilled fuel remained pooled under the wings 
and the area of the fire did not increase rapidly. During crash fire 3 
there was little wind 50 that the flames from both sides of the fuselage 
tended to merge, forming a canopy of flame around and over the fuselage. 
The airplane also came to rest on an upslope, causing fuel to run back 
so that the resulting fire more completely enveloped the fuselage. As 
a result} the escape time in the fuselage during crash 3 was littl~ more 
than half that in the same location for crash 1 - 90 seconds as compared 
with 163 seconds} respectively. 
The effect of the occupant's position in the airplane with respect 
to the major bulk of the fire is shown by the data from crash 6. In 
this fire the wind direction was such that the passenger compartment in 
the fuselage was almost completely bathed in flame while the front end 
and pilot's compartment were not involved (fig. 12) . Subsequent growth 
of the fire both outside and inside the fuselage graduallY involved the 
pilot's compartment and front end of the airplane . As a result the 
escape time as limited by pain was only 53 seconds in the fuselage as 
compared with 144 seconds for the pilot ' s compartment . 
Passengers seated near windows that face a fir e will be subjected 
to more intense radiation than those protected by the fuselage walls, 
and the available escape time will be corr espondingly decreased. The 
_J 
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relative magnitude of this effect is shown by the comparison of the 
calorimeter bulb temperatures given in figure 13 . Although both calorim-
eter bulbs were exposed to the fire in the forward end of the cabin, the 
bulb facing the window could also receive radiation directly from the 
fire on the left side of the airplane. As a result this bulb indicated 
a temperature of 7000 F wi thin 110 seconds after the fire star-ted, while 
the bulb protected by the fuselage walls did not reach 7000 F until 
160 seconds had elapsed. 
The plastic materials sometimes used for window panes soften rapidly 
when heated and melt so that passengers will be exposed directly to 
flame, hot gases, and smoke. Figure 14 shows two stages in the disinte-
gration of such window materials. 
Although these results indicate that the mlnlillum escape time as 
limited by thermal injury is about 50 seconds, different crash circum-
stances may further reduce this minimum value . When there is direct 
contact between flame and the fuselage skin while the airplane is moving 
rapidly, the fuselage skin burns through ~uickly . Figure 15 shows the 
damage resulting from direct flame contact with the fuselage skin for 
7~ seconds while the airplane was sliding to a stop. The fuel-air mix-
ture was arranged to be practically stoichiometric in this case; thus the 
flame temperatures were above those of the smoky flame existing during 
convectionally aspirated fires. The damage shown is typical of the 
entire flame contact area. Under such Circumstances, occupants seated 
near fuselage walls could be burned by flame when the fuselage skin burns 
through; thus the minimum escape time would be less than 50 seconds. 
Effect of insulation on escape time. - Since commerical transport 
aircraft are e~uipped with sound and thermal insulation it was necessary 
to determine whether the thermal escape times in an insulated cabin would 
be essentially different from those listed in table I for uninsulated 
cabins. In order to obtain a valid comparison, two identical enclosures 
(the rear clam-shell doors from previously crashed cargo-type airplanes) 
were used. One of these enclosures was left uninsulated, the other was 
provided with 2 inches of glass wool held in place with a thin insula-
tion and fabric pad. These enclosures were faced into the wind in such 
a position that fire would be similar around each enclosure. Pans con-
taining e~ual ~uantities of fuel were placed in front of each enclosure 
and then ignited simultaneously. The ambient air and calorimeter tem-
perature histories inside each enclosure were recorded. 
The temperature histories for the insulated and uninsulated shells 
are shown in figure 16 . This figure shows that in the initial stages of 
the fires the temperatures inside the insulated enclosure remained below 
those in the uninsulated enclosure. Seven and one -half minutes after 
the fires were started the inSUlated enclosure burned through. The tem-
peratures inside this enclosure then increased rapidly and were e~ual to 
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those in the uninsulated enclosure 8 minutes after the fires were 
started. Thereafter, until the test was terminated, the insulated 
enclosure temperatures remained above those in the uninsulated enclosure. 
The uninsulated skin burned through 12 minutes after the test was 
started. Uninsulated skin melts away more slowly than insulated because 
heat from the fire can reradiate from the opposite skin surface. 
As a result of these temperature conditions the thermal escape time 
for the insulated enclosure was about 8 minutes; whereas for the unin-
sulated enclosure, the escape time was ~ minutes. These escape times 
show that the glass wool insulation presently used in commercial trans-
port aircraft will not increase the escape time appreciably and may 
decrease the available time slightly. The glass wool insulation also 
offers little obstruction to the passage of flame and gases because it 
tends to shrink and fall away from its supports when exposed to direct 
flame contact. The shrinkage resulting from such flame contact is shown 
by figure 17. 
Effect of fuel volatility on escape time. - When studying the effect 
of fuel vola tility on escape time, two general fuel spillage conditions 
are recognized as being significant: one in which a large quantity of 
fuel mist is evolved, and one in which the fuel flows from ruptured fuel 
tanks to the ground in a predominantly liquid stream. 
In two crashes in which the ignition of large volumes of low-
volatility (0.1 lb Reid vapor pressure) fuel mist occurred, the result-
ing fires developed with the same rapidity as those crashes in which 
gasoline mists of comparable size were ignited. Figures 10 (gasoline 
fire, test 6) and 18 (low-volatility-fuel fire, test 7) show the fire 
resulting when gasoline and low-volatility fuel mists, respectively, were 
ignited under essentially similar circumstances. These photographs were 
taken at approximately the same time after ignition occurred and show 
that the fires had grown to approximately the same size in the same time 
interval. 
Comparison of the escape times for crashes 6 and 7 (table I) shows 
that the escape time in the pilot's compartment for a gasoline fire 
(crash 6) was 144 seconds as compared with only 93 seconds in the same 
location for a low-volatility-fuel fire (crash 7). This result appears 
to indicate tha t the escape time is longer for gasoline. When comparing 
the escape time for the fuselage, however, the escape time associated 
with the gasoline fire was only 53 seconds, whereas the escape time for 
the low-volatility-fuel fire was 92 seconds. Further inspection of the 
data shows that these apparently contradictory results are explained by 
the difference in wind direction for the two crashes. During crash 6 
the wind was more nearly perpendicular to the fore and aft axis of the 
fuselage so that the main fuselage was enveloped in flame while the 
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pilot's compartment was not . For this reason there was a difference of 
about 90 seconds in the escape time between the two positions. The wind 
conditions during crash fire 7, on the other hand, were such that the 
pilot's compartment and fuselage were both enveloped in flame and the 
escape times were nearly equal. Comparieon of the data from these 
crashes thus gives no indication of significant escape-time advantage to 
be gained from decreasing the fuel volatility when large vo]_umes of fuel 
mist are ignited and a large flash fire follows. The large quantity of 
heat released b~ the fuel-mist fire raises the temperature of the fuel 
tank environment above the flash temperature of the low-volatility fuel 
and most of the advantage expected from reduced fuel volatility is lost. 
When fire involves fuels of different volatility spilled on the 
ground in liquid form, however, there is a difference in the rate of fire 
development, and thus a difference in escape time. In figure 19 are 
shown the time - fuselage skin temperature relations for three fires in 
which the fuel was allowed to pour to the ground from ruptured tanks of 
an unburned wrecked airplane hulk. The fuel was ignited by a torch on 
the ground . The development of the fire was recorded by motion pictures, 
and the time history of the airplane skin temperatures, by j_nstruments . 
Wind conditions and fuel spillage rate were essentially similar in all 
tests. In order to preserve the hulk for successive fires, fire extin-
guishing was started at the time fire had reached the under surface of 
the wing, as indicated on the curves. 
Comparison of the rate of fuselage skin temperature rise for fires 
involving gasoline and low-volatility fuel at nearly the same initial 
fuel temperature (fires 1 and 2, respectively, fig. 19) shows that the 
low-volatility-fuel fire developed less rapidly than the gasoline fire. 
A corresponding increase in escape time would result. During the gas -
oline fire the fuselage skin temperature increased about 800 F per min-
ute, whereas the rate for low-volatility fuel was 450 F per minute. 
The gasoline fire developed so rapidly that it reached the lmder surface 
of the wing in about 50 seconds. A time interval of almost 200 seconds 
was required for the low-volatility-fuel fire to reach the same relative 
size. The final fuselage skin temperature resulting from the gasoline 
fire was less than for the low-volatility-fuel fire only beeause the 
gasoline fire was of shorter duration. 
When the initial temperature of the low-volatility fuel was 
increased (fire 3, fig. 19), the escape-time benefit to be gained by 
using low- vapor-pressure fuel decreased. During fire 3 the initial fuel 
temperature was approximately 850 F as compared with 600 F for fire 2. 
Shortly before the fire was extinguished, the rate of temperature rise 
of the fuselage skin was practically equal in the two experiments: 750 F 
per minute for the low- volatility-fuel fire as compared with 800 F per 
minute for the gasoline fire . Furthermore, comparison of the times at 
which the fire had reached the underside of the wing indicates that the 
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850 F low-volatility-fuel fire had reached the same stage of development 
in 75 seconds that the gasoline fire had reached in 60 seconds. While 
it is difficult to generalize from one experiment, the results appear to 
show that increasing the initial fuel tempera~ure decreases the escape-
time advantage of the lower volatility fuel. 
Toxic Gases 
The consumption of cabin oxygen in the fire and the generation of 
toxic combustion products present a survival hazard in addition to the 
heat released. Carbon monoxide) carbon dioxide) aldehydes, fuel fumes, 
and smoke from burning fuel and oil are generally considered to be the 
most plentiful and hazardous of the combustion products that may be 
produced. Other toxic gases can be formed from the burning of doped 
fabrics, interior trim, and electrical insulation. The gases in this 
latter group were not encountered in this study. 
Physiological criteria: carbon monoxide and oxygen deficiency. -
The presence of carbon monoxide and subnormal oxygen concentration both 
result in anoxia (anoxemia)j therefore the effects of these two gases 
will be considered together. Carbon monoxide produces anoxia by com-
bining with the hemoglobin to form carboxyhemoglobin and thus reduce the 
oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood. The physiological effects of 
increasing the carboxyhemoglobin concentration in the blood stream are 
shown in table II. This table shows that a carboxyhemoglobin concentra-
tion of 30 percent results in impaired judgment and fainting if any 
con~iderable exertion is attempted, while concentrations between 40 and 
50 percent result in fainting and collapse on slight exertion. Since 
any escape attempt may involve exertion comparable with light work, a 
concentration of 35 percent carboxyhemoglobin in the blood stream was 
chosen as limiting the escape time. 
The factors which determine carbon monoxide absorption rate are 
presented in reference 8. In this reference) it is shown that the per-
centage of carboxyhemoglobin in the blood stream depends upon the carbon 
monoxide concentration, the duration of the exposure, and the volume of 
a ir inhaled per unit time by exposed persons as determined by their 
activity. The volume of air inhaled per unit time is usually called the 
"pulmonary ventilation rate," but will be designated the ventilation 
rate in this discussion . The carbon monoxide concentration and duration 
of exposure are factors affected by the circumstances of the accident 
and resulting fire. The ventilation rate depends upon the type of work 
being done. For this analysis) it has been assumed that the ventilation 
rate would be e~ual to that resulting from light work. Reference 8 also 
shows that a decrease in the oxygen concentration has little effect upon 
the rate of carbon monoxide absorption r ate except for changes caused in 
the ventilation rate by decreases in oxygen concentration. The rate of 
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carbon monoxide absorption was ther efor e corr ected for the increased 
ventilation r ate . The details of these calculati ons and corrections ar. 
shown in appendix B. 
Physiological criteria: carbon dioxide . - The relatively short 
exposures to carbon dioxide of less than 10 to 15 minutes duration result 
in anoxia , irritation of the eyes and r espirator y system, increased 
breathing r ate , f aintness , and finally, unconsciousness. The physio-
logical data repqrted for carbon dioxide (ref . 9) show that the time of 
useful consciousness depends upon the concentration of car bon dioxide 
and duration of exposure but do not i ndicate a sharply defined threshold 
concer ni ng the effect of abnorma l concentr ation. Curves of this thres -
hold of consci ousness as i nterpreted by various investigators are shown 
in figure 20 . 
Since curve 2 (fig. 20) indicates the conditions that can be toler -
ated by most individuals and is little mor e sever e than the limits chosen 
by Spealman or King (ref. 10), this cur ve was chosen as the basis for 
escape time cal culati ons , although the results may indicate shorter 
escape times than would actually exist . The escape times were determined 
by the gr aphical method re commended in appendix 1 of refer ence 9. This 
graphical method is so arranged that the ~uantity of carbon dioxide 
inhaled under the varying concentrations that occur during a fire is 
e~uated to the maximum that can be tolerated as indicated by the toler -
ance curve · 
History of gas concentrations and associated escape times. - Because 
of the difficulty experienced in obtaining samples of the cabin atmos-
phere during the fire following a crash, it was necessary to obtain the 
information on the concentrations of toxic gases in the airplane by 
setting fire to the hulks of airplanes that did not burn when previously 
crashed . The fires were arranged to follow the same history as the 
crash fires observed . 
Time histories of the carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and oxygen 
concentrations in the pilot and passenger compartments together with the 
associated escape times for these hulk fires are shown in figure 21. For 
comparison with these gas concentration histories, the composition of . 
Single samples of the cabin atmosphere obtained during three crash fires 
is shown in table III. These samples were obtained at various times 
after crash impact, as shown in the fourth column of the table. 
Inspection of the gas concentration histories and of the isolated 
values given in table III shows that the composition of the cabin atmos-
phere can vary widely with time from crash to crash. During ~he two 
hulk fires (fig. 21) the carbon monoxide concentration reached a maximum 
value of'approximately 4 percent. The crash fire data show, however, 
that higher carbon monoxide concentrations are possible, since one con-
centration of 12 percent of carbon monoxide was measured. Combustion 
studies indicate that such concentrations are possible when the oxygen 
supply is limited. 
NACA TN 2996 13 
The maximum carbon dioxide concentration encountered was approxi-
mately 15 percent in the forward part of the cabin in hulk fire 1 and 
occurred at the time of lowest oxygen concentration (5 percent) for this 
particular position. The minimum oxygen concentration encountered was 
less than 1 percent and occurred at the same location and time at which 
the 12 percent of carbon monoxide was encountered. 
The escape times established by the chosen criteria and based on 
the concentrations measured during the hulk fires are listed in table IV. 
For purposes of comparison) the escape times as limited by a second-
degree burn are also included. The second-degree burn escape times for 
these hulk fires range from 55 to 319 seconds and are comparable with 
those obtained during the crash fires and listed in table I. 
The escape times as limited by carbon monoxide poisoning exceeded 
300 seconds in both hulk fires (table IV). The relatively lar ge escape 
times) as compared with thermal injury) associated with carbon monoxide 
stem from the fact that carboxyhemoglobin is formed only when carbon 
monoxide replaces the oxygen as it is used by the body. Since about 
35 percent of the oxyhemoglobin in the blood must be converted to 
carboxyhemoglobin before fainting occurs upon slight exertion) the 
escape time can be expected to exceed 1 minute even though carbon mon-
oxide concentrations of the order of 12 percent) the maximum shown in 
table III) exist continuously. Although the escape times as limited by 
carbon monoxide pOisoning are longer than those limited by thermal skin 
injury) the difference does not justify disregarding carbon monoxide as 
a hazard. 
The physiological tolerance limit for carbon dioxide was reached 
only once during the 10-minute sampling period for these two fires. In 
this one case) the forward cabin of hulk fire 1) the carbon-dioxide 
escape time was 365 seconds as compared with 398 seconds for carbon-
monoxide poisoning and 151 seconds for a second-degree skin burn 
(table IV). In no case did carbon dioxide limit the escape time; thus 
carbon dioxide is not considered so important a hazard as either carbon 
monoxide poisoning or thermal injury. 
The free hydrocarbon concentrations shown in figure 21 indicate 
that fuel -air mixtures near the combustible range exist at times in some 
of the passenger and crew compartments. These concentrations are due to 
the rapid evaporation of fuel) hydraulic flUid, and oil. The destruc-
tive distillation of wood sometimes used in the floor structure can also 
produce hydrocarbon vapors. Under hydrocarbon concentration conditions 
shown) fire can spread in the occupied compartments with explosive 
rapidity when the fuel-air mixture reaches the combustible range. Fig-
ure 22 shows the flame from such an explosion escaping through the for-
ward fuselage door. 
l 
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Human exposure to hydrocarbon vapors in the smaller concentrations 
even though fire does not occur can result in anesthesia and is fatal if 
the concentration is large or the exposure is too long. Gasoline vapor 
concentrations of 2 to 3 percent are fatal for short exposures (ref. 11). 
The exact timewise limits are not specified, however; thus, the effect 
of the concentrations recorded in these fires cannot be evaluated. 
Smoke and aldehydes. - Both smoke and certain of the combustion 
products which are irritating to the eye can interfere with vision and 
make escape difficult. Motion pictures of the cabin interior during a 
fire showed that even strongly illuminated objects 20 feet away could 
not be photographed 10 seconds after smoke began entering the cabin even 
though the opening admitting the smoke was only 2 feet in diameter. 
Since fuselage walls can burn through in as little as 1/2 minute under 
conditions in which the airplane is not in motion, smoke can begin to 
reduce visibility inside the fuselage a short time after fire starts. 
The odor of certain gas samples indicated that aldehydes were 
present in passenger and crew compartments. Analysis of one sample indi-
cated an aldehyde concentration of approximately 1/2 of 1 percent. In 
this concentration, aldehydes are very irritating to the eyes and respir-
atory system (ref. 11). An escape time as limited by the various 
aldehydes could not be calculated because of insufficient physiological 
data. 
Escape avenues. - Motion pictures of the fires were studied to 
determine where escape avenues through the exterior flame are most likely 
to be located. In general, the avenues through which escape would be 
possible and the time interval during which these avenues remain open 
are determined by three major factors: 
(a) The circumstances of the fuel spillage, which, in turn, deter-
mine whether one or both sides of the airplane are involved in 
fire, the location of fire with respect to the fuselage, and 
whether the fire receives a strong initial impetus or builds 
up gradually 
(b) The design of the airplane, which determines the location of 
the bulk of fuel with respect to the occupants 
(c) The wind direction with respect to the fire and fuselage 
During the fires studied, the fuel spillage circumstances were such that 
fire existed on both sides of the airplane. In some of the crashes, the 
fuel mist was ignited and provided a strong initial impetus so that the 
fires built up rapidly. The fuel was located outboard of the engine 
nacelles, and the wings were attached to the fuselage at a position 
along the longitudinal axis typical of present-day commercial transport 
~ J 
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aircraft. The wind varied from a light breeze to one having a speed of 
about 15 miles per hour and usually had a tail wind component because of 
the necessary orientation of the crash site with respect to the prevail-
ing wind direction. These conditions thus result in a fairly severe fire 
with respect to the possibility of escape. 
The escape conditions for four typical crashes are shown in fig-
ure 23. During crash 1 (fig. 23(a)), escape was possible in one direc-
tion or another at all times during the 5-minute interval studied. The 
upwind escape route to the right rear was open continuously after the 
initially spilled fuel had burned away. The appearance of this escape 
avenue is shown in figure 24(a). During crash fire 3 (fig. 23(b)), an 
escape route to the left front (fig. 24(b)) was open continuously dur-
ing the 5-minute interval. The upwind route to the left rear was open 
for only 1 minute because fuel spilling from the ruptured tanks and fuel 
system running down the slope upon which the airplane came to rest 
reenveloped the aft part of the fuselage and would have prevented further 
escape in this direction. The escape avenue existing during this 
l-minute interval is shown in figure 24(c). During crash fire 6 
(fig. 23(c)), an escape avenue to the right front existed continuously 
after the initial flash fire involving the fuel mist had burned away. 
During crash fire 7 (fig. 23(d)), except f or the 10- t o 15-second inter-
vals indicated, escape was also possible out of either side to the rear 
after the fuel mist had burned away. Figures 24(d) and (e) show the 
escape avenues during these two crash fires. Although this analysis 
indicates that escape avenues exist in the majority of crash fires, this 
result must be qualified to some extent. Landings and take-offs are 
normally made into the wind; consequently, if an accident occurs and 
fire spreads rapidly to both sides of the airplane, flame would be 
carried past the main passenger compartment doors, effectively blocking 
escape toward the rear. Furthermore, passage through the forward end of 
the fuselage and thence through escape hatches and into a forward 
escape avenue is frequently obstructed by galley eqUipment, baggage 
storage, and crew accommodations plus possible damage to the forward end 
of the fuselage. Under such circumstances escape from many present 
transport airplanes would be difficult. This qualification, however, 
does not change the fact that escape avenues exist with sufficient fre-
quency that measures for increasing the escape time inside the fuselage 
are justified. 
Rigorous specific procedures to be followed in seeking an escape 
avenue cannot be formulated on the basis of these results. The study of 
various escape avenues discussed in the previous paragraphs indicates 
that, generally, the most likely location of escape avenues will be 
toward the upwind portions of the airplane unless fire exists on only 
one side of the fuselage. This result can also be extensively modified, 
however, by the fuel spillage pattern and the airplane design. An 
example of the effect of fuel spillage pattern is shown by a comparison 
l_ 
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of the escape avenues for crash fires 6 and 7, in which the wind and 
terrain conditions were similar. The escape avenue for crash f ire 6 
(fig. 23(c)) is toward the right front, "rhile for crash fire 7 
(fig. 23(d)) escape was possible from either side of the rear end of the 
airplane, both upwind and downwind. Study of the motion pictures of 
these two fires shows that this difference in possible escape routes is 
the result of differences in fuel spillage pattern caused by variations 
in the extent of fuel tank damage. In the case of a irplanes with the 
wing and fuel tanks well forward with respect to the fuselage, the most 
feasible escape route could be toward the rear because of the protection 
afforded by the fuselage, which together with the convective lifting of 
the flame would allow occupants to escape rearward and underneath the 
flame even though a headwind exists. 
Missiles 
The motion pictures of crashes and the post-crash examination of 
airplanes that were crashed without burning indicated the hazard imposed 
by detached airplane parts and explosion-propelled fragments. No data 
were obtained concerning the hazard resulting from normally unattached 
cabin eqUipment or equipment torn from its moorings within the airplane 
that become missiles under the effect of impact decelerations. All such 
equipment was salvaged from the airplanes before the crash. 
Detached propeller parts. - The impact of hollow steel propeller 
blades with an obstacle with the engines at take-off power sometimes 
causes the entire blade to twist out of the hub, as shown by figure 25. 
In some instances detached blades passed through both cabin walls and 
then traveled 400 to 500 feet. Figure 26 shows the holes made in the 
upper part of the fuselage by two detached blades. 
Forged aluminum blades generally do not twist out of the hubs but 
the tips break off and become missiles (fig. 27). It should be noted 
that the propeller section shown is a part broken from the blade after 
the tip had already been removed. A single blade may thus provide more 
than one missile. Occasionally an aluminum blade breaks at the shank. 
The flying blade fragments generally penetrate one fuselage wall and 
then ricochet from the opposite wall or other cabin structure. Fig-
ure 28 shows nine holes made in the wall of a fuselage by fra~nents 
from the right propeller. 
Since the propellers of the airplanes used in this study rotate in 
a clockwise direction, the distribution of damage to the fuselage by 
propeller parts (fig. 29) indicates that parts broken from the propellers 
separate from the hub or parent blade in a half revolution or less after 
an obstacle has been struck. The direction of motion of such parts is 
thus determined by the direction of motion in the lower half of the 
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propeller. Turning propellers in such a direction that the motion of 
the blades below the center of rotation is away from the fuselage would 
reduce the probability of propeller fragments entering the airplane. 
The propeller fragments broken from the blade upon ground i mpact would 
then have an initial impulse directed away from the fuselage. 
Landing gear parts . - Front landing-wheel strut and support struc-
ture broken in the crash impact can penetrate the fuselage . Figure 30 
shows a hole approximately 2 by 3 feet torn in the floor 20 feet aft of 
the nose-wheel location by the broken front -wheel str ut and guide slip-
per which is attached to the strut in place of the front wheel. These 
parts came through the floor at high velocity, struck the instrument 
box, and rebounded to the position near the front door shown in fig-
ure 31. Another example of floor damage caused by destruction of the 
front landing gear is shown by figure 32 . Figure 33 shows the destruc-
tion of the bulkhead to which the landing gear is attached. This struc -
ture came to rest practically in the dummy ' s lap and the entire floor 
was raised approximately 3 feet. A person seated in this location would 
certainly not have been able to escape serious injury. It is expected 
that destruction similar to that shown in these figures would result if 
the front landing wheel and strut wer e to collide with a solid obstacle 
during a forced landing. The hazard from dislodged landing-gear parts 
is minimized if the crash occurs with the landing gear retracted. 
Explosions. - The explosion of large Quantities of fuel vapor - air 
mixtures that may be formed within the wings following damage to the 
fuel system may spread flaming fuel and wing parts over distances sev-
eral times the wing length. Wing explos ions may occur if the initial 
ignition is delayed a sufficient time for consider able mixing of fuel 
and air to occur in the wing. The violence of such explosions is shown 
by figure 34. These three photographs show an explosion and the result-
i ng wing-structure damage when an explosive mixture in the wing panel 
outboard of the fuel tanks was ignited 4~ seconds after impact. 
Once the wing fuel is burning the likelihood of explosions declines 
and the explosions of pockets of fuel-air mixtures that do occur are 
seldom of sufficient violence to project wing parts into the air or to 
scatter flaming fuel. Damage under these circumstances is usually lim-
ited to tearing of the wing skin. Figure 35 shows the effect of a wing 
explosion that occ urred after the main fire had been burning for about 
9 minutes . 
The explosion of hydraulic eQUipment , such as struts, actuating 
cylinders , and accumulators, containing trapped liQuids usually occurs 
after the fire is well developed. Because these members of the hydrau-
lic system are massive, they can withstand the heat of an intense fire 
for several minutes before explos ive failure occurs. The accumulated 
----_. ~-----
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parts of a hydraulic strut cylinder that exploded in a crash fire are 
shown in figure 36. A fragment of hydraulic strut cylinder wall that 
was propelled about 150 feet when the strut exploded is shown in fig-
ure 37. The danger to airplane occupants from this source is particu-
larly sign.ificant because many components of the hydraulic system and 
occasionally large quantities of fuel are carried within the fuselage. 
Structural Destruction of Occupied Compartments 
The airplanes that did not burn were also carefully studied for 
information concerning the hazards to which occupants would be exposed 
when the structure surrounding and supporting the occupants is damaged. 
The damage that resulted in these crashes can be considered typical of 
a moderately severe wheels-up belly landing. 
Floor-structure damage. - The floor structure of the low-midwing, 
twin-engine type airplane is not damaged when the landing is made on a 
solid surface like dry or frozen ground or on pavement. The fuselage 
skin supporting structure and the nacelle structures deform and absorb 
the landing shock, thus protecting the floor and upper fuselage struc-
ture. Figure 38 shows the exterior of such a fuselage and shows that 
there was no appreciable deflection of the floor line. 
Aircraft in which the floor and the fuselage skin are attached to 
the same structural members are considerably damaged when subjected to 
belly landing conditions. The entire vertical impact and sliding fric-
tion forces are imposed on this structure. When the landing is made 
upon a solid surface like a paved runway or hard dry or frozen SOil, 
structural distortion such as shown by figures 39 and 40 occurs. The 
side frame and floor support members bend, allowing the corner bent 
connecting these two members to rotate (fig. 39). The seats and seat 
belts for fuselage occupants are attached to this corner bent. The 
floor support members in the front end of the fuselage are usually 
bulged upward slightly (fig . 40). This small distortion is not 
dangerous to occupants. 
If the landing surface is soft and yielding like mud and is several 
inches deep, the floor structure may be severely damaged. Loose mate-
rial enters the floor structure through the front landing-gear opening 
or through breaks in the fuselage skin and packs into the spaces between 
the fuselage skin and floor, thus distorting and bulging the floor struc-
ture. Extreme examples of such damage are shown in figure 4,1. The 
floor was bulged upward from 2 to 3 feet and the corner bent was rotated 
from 200 to 300 from its original position. Further rotation of this 
corner bent occurs when the airplane is subjected to side loads that in 
turn impose further vertical loads on the structure. Such a situation 
is shown in figure 42. In this case the corner bent has been rotated 
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from 900 to about 120u from its original position and at the rear appears 
about to fold under the floor. The hazard to occupants under such cir-
cumstances would depend upon the extent to which the corner bent has 
been rotated and the location of the occupant with respect to the damage. 
Lateral collapse of fuselage. - Lateral collapse of rectangular 
fuselage structures used in some cargo aircraft may occur if the fuse-
lage is subjected to side loads such as would result if ~n airplane were 
involved in a ground-loop accident and the main landing gear collapsed. 
Incipient fuselage collapse was noted in one crash in which the 
airplane was placed in a ground loop by removing only one of the main 
landing gear assemblies at the crash barrier. The other main landing 
gear was left undamaged. 
The damage resulting from the lateral load on the fuselage is shown 
in figures 43(a) and (b). The vertical wall members were torn away from 
the ceiling members (fig. 43(a)), and several vertical wall members 
showed buckling and shearing (fig. 43(b)). In figures 43(c), (d), and 
(e) are shown a further collapse of the fuselage structure when a second 
a irplane was ground looped about 1200 from its original direction after 
both main landing wheels were removed. The vertical wall members were 
buckled as shown by figure 43(c), several of the vertical members were 
torn away frOID the ceiling members as can be seen in figure 43(d), and 
the fuselage wall was bulged and distorted as shown by figure 43(e). 
The instrument box, by supporting the fuselage ceiling (fig. 43(c)), 
prevented the fuselage from collapsing completely. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The implications of the data and results presented in the preceding 
sections should be considered with respect to airplane construction and 
operation. Certain remedial measures may be suggested that would 
increase the time available for escape or make the escape less difficult , 
The results of this study indicate that approximately 50 seconds would 
be available for escape in all but the most severe fires, although in 
some cases passengers must move away from areas of burned-through fuse-
1 
lage skin in as few as 72 seconds. 
Of the possible protective measures that can be suggested, the 
data presented have shown that additional escape time cannot be pro-
vided by the present transport sound and thermal insulation. Therefore: 
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the substitution of other materials that could serve as an adeQuate 
flame and gas barrier as well as thermal and sound insulation should be 
considered. 
In order to extend the escape time, such a proposed heat, gas, and 
sound barrier must satisfy definite reQuirements in addition to that of 
thermal and sound insulation. Study of the various modes whereby heat 
is transferred from the fire to the occupants shows that more than half 
the heat absorbed by the exposed human skin is transmitted by radiationj 
thus the barrier must reflect a large percentage of the infrared radia-
tion from the fire. The barrier must also be essentially gas tight in 
order to exclude flame, hot toxic gases, and smoke. Molten metal from 
the melting fuselage skin must not drip through on the occupantsj there-
fore, the insulation should be able to support the weight of the molten 
metal that drips on it. A barrier satisfying these reQuirements would 
also have the advantage of excluding the steam formed by the use of water 
in rescue operations. Since melting of the fuselage skin and horizontal 
stringers would leave only the main frames and bulkheads to support the 
barrier, it must have sufficient mechanical strength to support itself 
between the frames or bulkheads. The Bureau of Standards has conducted 
exploratory tests on various combinations of intumescent paint, insula-
tion, and metal foil for barriers that might increase the fire resist-
ance of the fuselage . The results indicate that the fire resistance of 
an aircraft fuselage can be modified, but the differences obtained with 
the materials used in this study were not of sufficient value to justify 
detailed consideration at this time. 
A fire barrier a lone , however, is not sufficient to protect the 
occupants completely and must be supplemented by other airplane modifi-
cations to prevent heat and gases from entering by other avenues. The 
window pane material must be fire reistant to prevent heat from destroy-
ing it and permitting hot gases and smoke to enter. Some means of 
excluding the radiant heat transmitted by the windows should also be 
provided. Flame, hot gases, and smoke can also be carried into the 
fuselage by convection through openings at the juncture of the wing and 
the fuselage structure and through heating and ventilating systems. 
This situation calls for adeQuate flame and gas barriers inside the 
structure between the wings and the occupied parts of the f~selage. 
The rapidity with which the fuselage skin burns through i f flame is 
in contact with the fuselage while the airplane is in motion shows that 
the passenger compartments and fuel tanks should be separated as far as 
practicable in a spanwise direction to prevent direct flame contact with 
the fuselage. Wide spanwise separation is not of itself sufficient, 
however, if fuel can drain down through the wing structure into the 
fuselage belly or wing center section and thus spread fire to the occu-
pied compartments. A means of preventing such fuel drainage should be 
placed inside the wing structure inboard of the fuel tanks. 
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The action of pain as a limit for escape time has been discussed. 
There are two other circumstances in which pain can be a factor in 
hindering or preventing the escape of airplane occupants: Heat con-
ducted from the exterior or absorbed by convection and radiation from 
the interior can raise the temperature of door and escape hatch handles 
to the point where passengers cannot touch them with bare hands. Since 
the pain resulting from touching metal at a temperature of about 1130 F 
will be practically unbearable (ref. 4), little heat need be absorbed 
to at least hinder the manipulating of these parts. The second circum-
stance in which pain can hinder escape arises when occupants must face 
direct radiation from exterior flame while escaping . Exposure to the 
intense radiation may produce such facial pain that escape will not be 
attempted (ref. 4). Any protective material such as clothing) curtains) 
blankets) or rugs that could be used to shield an occupant's exposed skin 
from direct radiation for a fe·w seconds would facilitate escape. The 
use of such material could be suggested to passengers by the crew mem-
bers as part of the evacuation procedure . 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The results of this study of hQman survival in airplane crashes 
followed by fire should be considered app licable only to accidents that 
are essentially similar to the crashes studied. 
1. For the severe crash fires studied, the survival times as lim-
ited by pain or skin burning ranged from 50 to 300 seconds. This vari-
ation in survival time depends primarily on the area of zones around the 
airplane wetted by the burning fuel, the slope of the terrain near the 
airplane, and the wind direction with respect to the relative positions 
of the fire and the airplane. During these crash fires, all fuel was 
carried outboard of the nacelles. In experiments in which fuel spillage 
occurred inboard of the nacelles at the forward part of the airplane , 
there was direct contact between the flames from this fuel and the fuse-
lage skin. In these circumstances the fuselage skin burned through in 
about 7t seconds. This situation would give minimum survival times 
appreciably less than 50 seconds. 
2. Because the escape times determined in this study for the hazards 
of skin burning, respiratory injury, and toxic gases do not differ 
greatly, protection must be provided against all three if a significant 
increase in escape time is to be made . 
3. The thermal and sound insulation presently used in transport 
airplanes will not increase the escape time appreciably and may decrease 
the escape time slightly. 
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4. Decreasing the fuel volatility will extend the escape time when 
the fuel is spilled in essentially li~uid form but is of little benefit 
when large ~uantities of fuel mist are formed by fuel spillage from a 
rapidly moving airplane . 
5 . Propeller fragments launched by impact of rotating propellers 
with the ground would have a reduced probability of entering the airplane 
if the rotating blades moved away from the fuselage in their travel below 
the axis of rotation . The propeller ~ragments broken from the blade upon 
ground impact would then have an initial impulse directed away· from the 
fuselage. 
Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
Cleveland) Ohio) May 1) 1953 
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APPENDIX A 
METHOD OF COMPUTING ESCAPE TIME BASED ON PAIN AND SECOND-DEGREE 
BURNS AS LIMITING CRITERIA 
Prepain escape time. - The severe pain accompanying extensive skin 
burns can prevent human beings from functioning rationally when exposed 
to fire and thus prevent possible escape from a burning airplane. Pain 
can therefore be used as a criterion for establishing a limit to the 
time available for escape . 
Experiments conducted with human beings exposed to radiating heat 
sources show the relation between the intensity of infrared radiation 
and duration of a continuous exposure to this radiation that causes 
unbearable pain (ref. 4). A summary of these data as they apply to the 
problem of computing the time available for escape from a burning air-
plane is plotted in figure 6 (prepain curve). This figure is a modifi-
cation of figure 3 from reference 4. The heat absorbed by the skin 
during a continuous exposure is plotted against the time at which 
unbearable pain occurs instead of infrared radiation intensity against 
time as in the original figure. 
The use of figure 6 for determining the prepain- escape time 
requires that the heat absorbed time curve for a particular crash and 
passenger position be plotted on the figure. The escape time is the 
time at which the heat absorbed curve reaches the lower pain tolerance 
curve. 
In these crash fire studies, the rate with which heat is absorbed 
by the skin by radiation from flames and hot surfaces and by convection 
from the air is obtained by calculation fr8m the temperature history of 
the copper bulb calorimeter in the following manner. The net rate of 
radiant heat absorption per unit area of skin (dq/dt)R is given by the 
well-known expression 
(dq) = R _ (seT4) 
\dt R skin 
where R is the heat radiated per unit time for all zones to which the 
skin is exposed and (seT4)skin is the heat radiated by the person's 
skin. The heat absorption rate to the skin by convection with the atmos-
phere is given by the equation 
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Therefore , the total rate of heat aosorption oy the skin is given oy 
(~i;) total == R - (seT4) k' + K (T , - T k ) s In alr s in ( 1) 
In this e~uation 
(~~) heat aosoroed by skin, cal/(s~ cm/min) 
\dt total 
R radiant heat absorption by skin, cal/(s~ cm/min) 
s Stefan-Boltzmann constant, 8.2X10-ll cal/(s~ cm/min/o~) 
e \emissivity 
T temperature of skin surface, OK 
K convective heat-transfer coefficient, cal/(s~ cm/min/oC) 
Tair ambient air temperature, °c 
The term R in e~uation (1) represents the only unknown if the 
skin temperature is assumed constant. It can oe shown that this assump-
tion introduces little error within the range of skin temperatures oeing 
considered and is therefore justified. Since the absorptivity of human 
skin and of the calorimeter bulb are essentially e~ual, the value of R 
is the same for the calorimeter and human skin. The value of R can 
then be computed from the recorded calorimeter temperature history oy 
using the relation expressed in e~uation (2 ) . The radiant energy to 
which the calorimeter bulb is exposed is partly absoroed oy the oulb in 
raising its temperature, partly reradiated to the surroundings, and 
partly lost by convection to the surrounding air if the oulb is aoove 
air temperature. Expressed mathematically, 
R = Wc 'ddTt ) + (seT4) + K (T 1 - T , ) \ cal cal ca alr 
In this e~uation 
w 
c 
ecal 
weight of calorimeter oulo per unit area, g/s~ cm 
specific heat, cal/g 
calorimeter temperature, °c 
emissivity of calorimeter oulb surface 
(2 ) 
4E 
• 
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Since the radiation to which either the calorimeter bulb or a human 
being's skin would be exposed is equal and the general dimensions of the 
bulb and of a human head are similar, the value of R obtained for the 
calorimeter can be considered to apply to a human head . The final equa-
tion for the rate of heat absorption by the skin is, from equations (1) 
and ( 2), 
( d
q) ( dT) 4 (4 dt = W c dt + (s eT) 1 - seT ) k' + K (T 1 - T k' ) absorbed cal ca s In ca s In 
The values of the various constants in equation (3) were established as 
follows: 
The weight per unit area of the copper sphere calorimeter was 
0.4 gram per square centimeter . The first term of the equation thus 
becomes 0.0368 dTcal/dt when the weight per unit area is multiplied by 
the specific heat of copper. 
In the second term of equation (3), the emissivity of the flat-
black lacquer surface of the copper calorimeter is 0.96 to 0.98 
(ref. 12). The second term thus becomes 
-11 4 8 . 2X10 X 0 .97 Tcal 
or 
-11 4 7 .95X10 Tcal 
The emissivity of human skin for the third term of the equation is 
0.9, based upon references 3 and 13 . Since normal human body temperature 
is 370 C and it can be shown that disregarding the skin temperature 
increase introduces a negligible error, the third term becomes 
_8 . 2X10- ll X 0.9 (37 + 273)4 = -0.7 cal/(sq cm/min) 
The value of 0.0026 for the convective heat-transfer coefficient K 
in the fourth term is based upon data presented in reference 12. This 
heat-transfer coefficient takes into account the general dimensions of 
the calorimeter bulb, which, in turn, approximates a human head, and 
natural convection air flow . This coefficient also changes the temper -
ature difference term to a 5/ 4 -power function . The fourth term then 
becomes 
0.0026 (T _ 37)5/4 
cal 
Assembling the individual terms gives the final equati on used for these 
calculations as 
(~{) = 0.0368(~!) +7.95X10-11xr!v cal -0.7+0. 0026(Tav cal-37)5/4 
absorbed cal 
( 4) 
L 
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By integration of equation (4) with time, the total heat absorbed 
by a square centimeter of exposed skin can be obtained. A time interval 
dt varying from 2 to 10 seconds was chosen for making the numerical 
integration, the time interval magnitude varying inverselr as the rate 
of change of temperature. The values of Tav cal and Tav cal corre -
spond to the average values existing during the successive t:Une inter-
vals dt chosen for the numerical integration. The values of heat 
absorbed at the end of the successive time intervals plotted on the same 
coordinates with figure 6 give the prepain-escape time at the intersec -
tion of the heat· absorption curve with the lower prepain curve, as shown 
by the example for crash 1, left front fuselage . 
Second-degree burn escape time. - Human beings can survive extensive 
skin burns unless relatively large portions of the body surface are 
involved. For those individuals who can function rationally regardless 
of the pain while sustaining second-degree burns over areas of the body 
limited to exposed skin such as face, arms, and legs, additional escape 
time may be available . 
Escape times based on minimal second- degree burns can b e computed 
from a knowledge of the skin temperature history. The skin temperature 
history is obtained by plotting on figure 44 the heat absorbed by the 
skin, provided by integration of equation (4) in the manner just 
described, and noting the times at which this curve crosses each of the 
constant skin-temperature lines. This skin temperature history is then 
used in conjunction with the integral 
75 , 000 
Tt + 273 dt (5) 
from reference 14 to determine the escape time. A minimal second-degree 
burn has been inflicted when the integrated value of the equation is 
equal to unity. In this equation t is the time in seconds, and Tt 
is the skin temperature at the epidermal-dermal interface. The stepwise 
integration of equation (5) requires that the skin temperature Tt 
correspon~ to the selected time interval dt in order to evaluate the 
e function. For convenience in evaluating this e f~~ction, definite 
increases in skin temperature were selected and the corresponding time 
interval was obtained "from figure 44 . From the stepwise integration of 
equation (5) a value of t is then obtained at which the value of 0 
is equal to unity. This value of t is the escape time as limited by 
a second-degree burn. An example of this procedure is presented later 
in the discussion. 
Figure 44 was developed from the data presented in table VI of ref-
erence 15 in combination with the prepain data presented by figure 6 . 
• 
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Table VI lists the histories of epidermal-dermal interface temperatures 
resulting from the exposure of young pigs to various circumambient and 
circumradiant temperatures. From the various circumambient and circum-
radiant temperatures listed it is possible to calculate the quantity of 
heat that must be absorbed per unit area of skin surface to raise the 
skin to the temperature listed in the table. With the quantity of heat 
absorbed and the skin temperature-time relations it is possible to plot 
curves that indicate the quantity of heat that must be ab sorbed at a 
steady rate during any particular time interval to maintain a given skin 
temperature. Such a figure based upon the data of t able VI alone , how-
ever, is not directly applicabl e to human beings because humans can 
tolerate more heat than pigs . Human beings perspire, whereas pigs do 
not; and the evaporation of this perspiration affords considerable pro-
tection against excess heat . 
A correction for the perspiration effect can be obtained by com-
paring the above data obtained from the study of pigs with the prepain 
data from reference 6 . The above data show the heat that will be 
absorbed in bringing pig skin up to and maintaining it at 450 C (line B 
in fig. 45) . Referen~e 4 provides this same information for human skin 
(line A in fig. 45) . The protective effect of perspiration is then the 
algebraic difference between the two sets of data (line C on fig. 45). 
The slope of the line representing the heat absorbed by perspiration 
(line C) shows that up to about 3 minutes a protection of 0.4 calorie 
per square centimeter per minute is provided by the evaporation of 
perspiration. The inflection point at about 3 minutes corresponds 
roughly to the earliest time at which copious perspiring begins when a 
person enters a hot environment (ref . 16). Thereafter the slope of this 
line in~reases to approximately 0.9 calorie per square centimeter per 
minute . These values for the protection afforded by perspiration, 0.4 
to 0 .9 calorie per square centimeter per minute, agree reasonab ly well 
with the values quoted in reference 3, 0 . 5 to 1.0 calorie per square 
centimeter per minute. Accordingly, line C was used as a base line and 
the heat absorbed data from the pig experiments (ref. 15) plotted above 
it to form figure 44. This figure thus includes the heat absorbed by 
the skin plus that required to evaporate the perspiration. 
In order to illustrate the use of figure 44 for determining the 
skin temperature history for use in equation (5), the calorimeter tem-
perature history for the left forward fuselage position (crash 1) in 
figure 8 was chosen as an example . The skin-temperature history is 
obtained by plotting the time history of heat absor bed by the skin for 
any particular passenger position in figure 44. The values of heat-
transfer rate for the example chosen, calculated by equation (4), show 
that heat transfer to the skin began 137 seconds after impact; thus time 
zero on figure 44 corresponds to 137 seconds on the calorimeter temper -
ature history (fig. 8) . The subsequent history of total heat absorbed 
by the skin up to any particular time is then plotted in figure 44 as 
L 
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shown. The intersections of the heat absorbed curve with the various 
constant - temperature lines provide the skin-temperature history as tab-
ulated here: 
Chart Skin 
time, temperature) 
sec °c 
18 40 
64 45 
78 50 
84 55 
91 60 
The second step in the procedure is to use this skin-temperature history 
in conjunction with equation (5 ) to determine the escape time. The 
initial time for the calculation with equation (5) is the time at which 
the skin temperature reaches 440 C and cumulative skin injury begins) 
54 seconds in this case. The integrated value of equation (5) equals 1, 
87 seconds after heat transfer to the skin begins; thus in this instance 
a minimal second-degree burn would have been inflicted 87 + 137 = 224 sec-
onds after impact; the value of escape time listed in table I. 
Because there are no well-defined physiological data to indicate 
in what way the effects of heat application on skin temperature are 
additive in an environment of rapidly changing temperature such as 
obtained in a crash fire, it is difficult to establish the error involved 
in computing human skin temperature histories by the stepwise procedure 
employed here. Comparison of human skin temperatures measured in experi-
ments in reference 6 ,with those computed by this stepwise procedure for 
the constant temperature environments established in their experiments 
shows the computed skin temperatures to be slightly higher than the 
measured values. Since the protective body mechanisms such as blood 
circulation and perspiration do not respond immediately to the rapidly 
fluctuating thermal environments which exist in crash fires, skin tem-
peratures can be expected to rise faster under these circumstances than 
would be the case in an equivalent elevated temperature that is uniform 
with time. This difference in computed and measured skin temperatures 
therefore agrees with the expected variation for the crash-fire problem 
and no attempt was made to adjust the computational procedure to give 
skin temperature histories in closer agreement with the experimental 
values obtained in reference 6. 
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APPENDIX B 
CALCULATION OF ESCAPE TIME AS LIMITED BY CARBON -MONOXIDE POISONING 
AND OXYGEN DEFICIENCY 
The varying carbon-monoxide concentrations en~ountered in personnel 
compartments duri ng aircr aft fires make it necess~ry to use a stepwise 
calculation procedure to determine the escape time. This appendix 
describes the details of the calculation procedure used. 
When human beings are exposed to atmospheres containing carbon 
monoxide the portion of the hemoglobin that has combined with carbon 
monoxide to form carboxyhemoglobin and thus is not capable of transport-
ing oxygen is given by the following equation) taken from reference 8: 
CORb = KX co x t 
where 
percent of carboxyhemoglobin formed 
co percent of carbon monoxide 
t exposure time in min 
In this equation the absorption constant K depends upon the volume of 
air required per minute by the exposed person . This volume) generally 
termed the "pulmonary ventilation rate" by physiologists) will be termed 
"ventilation rate" throughout this discussion . 
The constant K is equal to 3 for persons ~t rest) 5 for light 
activity) 8 for light work) and 11 for heavy work . For these studies) 
it was assumed that the pilots were engaged in light work) pulse 110 and 
ventilation rate 18 liters per minute) and an absorption factor of 8 was 
used for the calculations . Passengers would not be so active as the 
crewj therefore they could tolerate the same carbon monoxide concentra-
tions for a somewhat longer time interval. 
Since both carbon monoxide pOisoning and low oxygen partial pres-
sures result in anoxia and since the larger carbon monoxide concentra-
tions are accompanied by decreased oxygen concentrations in an aircraft 
fire) these two factors are considered simultaneously. It is shown in 
reference 8 that the carbon monoxide absorption rate is independent of 
lowered oxygen pressure provided allowance is made for the increase in 
ventilation rate caused by low oxygen pressure. 
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The correction required to account for a variation in ventilation 
rate caused by decreased oxygen pressure can be determined from data 
presented in reference 8. This reference presents human data :E'rom which 
a relation between altitude and ventilation rate can be obtained. This 
relation was then converted to a relation between oxygen concentration 
at sea level and ventilation rate, and is plotted as line A-A in fig-
ure 46. The relation between ventilation rate, as determined by work 
level, and the corresponding absorption factor is presented as line B-B, 
which is based upon data also available in reference 8. The absorption 
coefficients given by line B-B were obtained at a normal sea-level 
oxygen concentration of 21 percent. In the crash tests the oxygen con-
centration iecreased as noxious gases mixed with the cabin air and some 
of the oxygen was consumed in the fire. No physiological data covering 
this circumstance exist; hence it is necessary to combine the effects of 
oxygen concentration on ventilation rate, as shown by line A-A, with the 
effect of ventilation rate on the absorption coefficient, as shown by 
line B-B. For this reason an assumption has been made that the effect 
of diminishing oxygen concentration is the same for light work as it is 
at rest . Line C-C is accordingly drawn parallel to line A-A through the 
sea-level value of ventilation rate for light work (18 liters per min). 
The corrected absorption factor for any particular ~xygen concentration 
is thus fOillld from figure 46 by finding a point on B-B vertically below 
the point on C- C corresponding to a given oxygen concentration. 
Because of the nonlinear change in the carbon monoxide and oxygen 
concentrations encountered in the crash fires, a stepwise method of 
calculating the increase in carboxyhemoglobin 1-laS required. Since the 
linear equation for carboxyhemoglobin 2oncentration 
COHb = 8 X COX t 
shows no influence of existing carboxyhemoglobin in the blood on the 
absorption rate, each increment in a stepwise computation shou.lil.. be 
additive . The calculation procedure thus is to determine the average 
carbon monoxide and oxygen concentrations during a time interval in 
which the gas concentrations vary at a reasonably uniform rate) deter-
mine the absorption factor corresponding to the average oxygen concen-
tration from figure 46, and then calculate the incremental carl)oxy-
hemoglobin concentration. The increments can then be added to obtain 
the total carboxyhemoglobin content at the end of each time interval. 
A time history of total accumulated carboxyhemoglobin content in 
the blood is then plotted against time to obtain the time history of 
carbon monoxide pOisoning. The time at which the total carboxyhemo-
globin content reaches 35 percent ) the selected limit, is considered to 
be the limit of the escape time . A sample calculation is ShO~l in the 
following paragraph. 
L __ ~ 
NACA TN 2996 31 
The sample calculation is based upon the time history of gas con-
centrations in the pilot's compartment during the first hulk fire 
(fig. 21). This time history shows that during the first half minute 
the average carbon monoxide concentration was practically zero and no 
gas could be absorbed. During the next half-minute period the average 
carbon monoxide concentration was 0 . 02 percent. During this same time 
interval the average oxygen concentration was 18.3 percent. Figure 4E 
shows that the absorption factor corres~onding to an 18.3 percent oxygen 
concentration is 8.3. The amount of CORb formed is then 
1 
.6percent CORt = 8·3 X 0 .01 X "Z = 0.04 percent 
The accumulated CORb is thus 0 .04 percent. 
The increment of CORb for the next time interval is 
1 
.6percent CORb ::: 8.5 X 0 .03 X 2" ::: 0.13 
The accumulated CORb by the end of this interval is then 0.04 + 0 . 13 = 
0.17 percent . These accumulated values are then plotted against time 
and the time at which the accumulated COHb reached 35 percent is con-
sidered to be the limit of escape time. 
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TABLE I . - ESCAPE TIME AVAILABLE BASED ON SKIN BURNING AND RESPIRATORY DAMAGE THRESHOLDS 
Crash Position Severe Minimal Respir- Air- Wind direction and speed Fuel 
in pain and second- atory plane 
airplane skin degree limit 
injury burn, (3900 F), 
begin, sec sec 
sec after after after 
impact impact impact 
1 Left 180 224 251 C-46 Gasoline 
front 
fuselage 11 Right 220 260 292 front tti~ fuselage 
Left rear 174 306 296 S5~yV fuselage 14 mph 
Right 163 180 288 
rear 
fuselage 
3 Pilot's 182 203 182 C-46 ~;~~~ Gasoline compart-ment Front 92 101 151 Ir\! fuselage Rear 90 100 138 
fuselage 
6 Pilot's 144 150 60 C- 82 r Gasoline 
compart-
ment 
Fuselage 53 59 131 [II 6 D 
13-16 mph~ 
7 Pilot's 93 97 112 C-82 Low-
compart- volatility 
ment fuel 
Fuselage 92 95 93 [II 6 D 
10 -15 mph~ 
500 ~ 
- - ---' 
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TABLE II. - PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF VARIOUS CARBON MONOXIDE 
HEMOGLOBIN PERCENTAGES 
} 
} 
} 
[Based on similar table in ref. llJ 
Immediately fatal 
Rapidly fatal 
lTnconsciousness; respiratory failure and death if 
exposure is long continued 
Headache; slight confusion, collapse and fainting 
on slight exertion 
Decided headache; irritable, easily fatigued, judgment 
disturbed} fainting upon any considerable exertion 
No appreciable effect in most instances, except 
shortness of breath even on moderate exertion} 
occasionally slight headache 
No appreciable effect except shortness of breath on 
vigorous muscular exertion 
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TABLE III. - REPRESENTATIVE CONCENTRATIONS OF NOXIOUS GASES 
PRODUCED BY FIRE AND FOUND IN COMPARTMENTS OF 
AIRPLANES DURING CRA.SH FIRES 
Crash Airplane Compart - Time Constituents) percent 
ment after CO CO2 O2 
a CH impact) 4 
sec 
1 Low Pilot 300 12 2.5 < 1 3 
midwing Passenger 300 0.1-0.5 0.6 19.5 0.1 or 
less 
6 High Pilot 120 0.015 0.7 20.0 
wing Front 180 0.1 2.2 17 . 4 
passenger 
Rear 60 0.1 trace 20.6 
passenger 
7 High Front 180 0.1 1.25 17 .5 
wing passenger 
Rear 60 0.1 3.4 13.0 
passenger 
~7 
~ydrocarbons other than CH4 were detected in small con-
centrations in one test. 
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TABLE IV. - ESCAPE TIMES FOR TWO FIRES BUILT AROUND 
PREVIOUSLY CRASHED BUT UNBURNED AIRPLANES 
Hulk Position Escape time) sec 
fire Carbon Minimal Carbon 
monoxide- second- dioxide 
oxygen degree 
depletion sKin 
burn 
1 Pilot's 397 319 ( a) 
compartment 
Forward 398 151 365 
cabin 
Aft (a) 257 ( a) 
cabin 
2 Pilot's 398 55 ( a) 
compartment 
Forward 305 65 ( a) 
cabin 
Aft ( a) 106 ( a) 
cabin 
aEscape time limit not reached. 
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(c) Crash 6 ; High wing cargo- type airp l ane ; fuel , gasoline. 
Figure 8 . - Continued . Time histories of ambient and calorimeter 
temperatures in various compartments during several crashes . 
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(d) Crash 7; high wing cargo- type airplane; fuel of low 
volatility . 
Figure 8 . - Concluded . Time histories of ambient and calorimeter 
temperatures in variou s compartments during several crashes . 
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Figure 9 . - Typical fuel mist formed when either gasoline or low volatility fuel tanks are ruptured while airplane 
i s in motion . Fue l mist appears as white cloud around and behind wing surfaces . No fire existed at time this 
photogr aph was taken . 
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Figure 10. - Fire resulting from ignition of cloud of gasoline mist. 
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(a) Crash 1. 
Figure 11. - Photographs showing development of fire during escape time . Upper photo-
graph shows initial fire or fire shortly after airplane stopped sliding; lower photo-
graph shows fire at end of ca lculated escape time . 
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(b) Crasb 3 . 
Figure 11. - Continued. Pbotograpbs sbowing development of fire during escape time . 
Upper pbotograpb sbows initial fire or fire sbortly after airplane stopped sliding; 
l ower pbotogr apb sbows fire at end of calculated escape time . 
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(c) Crash 7 . 
Figure 11. - Concluded. Photographs showing development of fire during escape time . 
Upper photograph shows initial fire or fire shortly after airplane stopped slidingj 
lower photograph shows fire at end of calculated escape time . 
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F~gure 12 . - Location of fire and wind direction eucb tbat fuselage is batbed in flame 
but pilot's compartment not enveloped . 
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(a) Pane beginning to melt. 
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C- 32902 
(b) Pane completely melted. 
Figure 14. - Two stages in disintegration of plastic window pane wben subjected to fire. 
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Figure 15. - Damage to fuselage skin resulting from 7.~ second contact with fire while airplane was in motion. 
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en 
o 
~ 
~ 
~ 
C\J 
<.D 
<.D 
en 
NACA TN 2996 
~ 
0 
~ 
Q) 
H 
~ 
~ 
aj 
H Q) 
~ Q) 
~ 
p 
.,-1 
~ 
!Il 
Q) 
ttl 
to 
rl 
Q) 
!Il 
~ 
200 I I I 
flFire reached under 
surface of wing----,..--
160 
II \ / ~ 
I ~ V 
120 
I ( V '/ 
A / 
80 
[0 r/ 
~ V Initial 
'I fuel 
temper-
ature) 
40 -Fire Fuel ~ 
0 1 Gasoline (100/130 grade) 55 
o 2 Low-volatility fO. l lb/sq in. 60 
A 3 Low-volatilit Reid vapor 85 y pressure) 
I I I 
o 60 120 180 240 
Time) sec ~ 
Figure 19. - Increase in fuselage skin temperature 
with time for three essentially similar fires but 
with fuel at various vapor pressures and initial 
temperatures. 
61 
oj.> 
c: 
QJ 
<l 
24 
~ 22 
0. 
c: 
o 20 
..... 
oj.> 
C\l 
H 
oj.> 
~ 18 
<l 
c: 
o 
<l 
QJ 16 
'd 
~ 
:a 14 
c: 
o 
.n 
~ 12 
<l 
oj.> 
c: 
~ 10 
C\l 
> 
..... 
50 
QJ 
.-< 
QJ 
> QJ 
.-< 
I 
C\l 
QJ 
Ul 
5 
6 
4 
o 
1 
\ 
1\ \ I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I All healthy individuals useful below Curve 1 - area of useful consciousness --
\ No healthy individual useful above Curve 2 - "absolute" area of conscious confusion No healthy i ndividual conscious above Curve 3 --1\ Area bet~een Curves 1 and 2 defines C02 - time concentrations at which any healthy 
-\ 
'" 
individual may become confused, unconscious , stuperous , or may function 
adequately - possible area of conscious confusion 
-
\. ~ 1 
\ l oJl~f 2 ~ ! 
"" 
unconsc i ous~ 
'\ ...... ", 
\ 
'" 
......... 
........... 
\ 
'" 
-........ 
-........ 
\ 1 of 7 "'- .......... ........... \ unconscious 
"" 
-..... 
........... 
~ ~ ---r--"- 3 of 31 r--
......... 
---
-ll ........... unconscious r--r--. Spealman ~ _ \ ~~UnPUbl!Shed ~ 4 subjects very r--- r--near tolerance - Curve 3 ~r-.. \ ~ef . 10 -r--~~r- r-- - :-- limits 
- -
I-- 1 of 41 
-........ -.tI- '-= unconscious 
---
-.... Cur~e fl 
--
r--
-
I--
-
t--
curle ~-1 
--60 1 ?O 180 240 300 360 420 480 540 6( 
Exposure time , sec ~
Figure 20 . - Threshold curves of carbon-dioxide concentration and duration of exposure tolerable by healthy human beings. 
(Curves 1, 2, and 3 from ref . 9 . ) 
o 
(J) 
N 
2 ;x:, 
~ 
~ 
N 
to 
to 
(J) 
NACA TN 2996 63 
.., 
s:: 
QJ 
() 
H 
QJ 
Po 
s::-
0 
.... 
..., 
ro 
H 
..., 
s:: 
QJ 
() 
s:: 
0 
() 
QJ 
'd 
"Q 
0 
s:: 
0 
E 
s:: 
0 
.0 
H 
C1l 
<:) 
2.0 20 
pl1 ot l, s domplrtJent I 13 . 9 \ 
1.6 
1.2 
.8 
.4 ..., 
s:: 
QJ 
() 
H 
QJ 
Po 
0 
s::-
0 
.... 
..., 
ro 
2 . 0 H ..., 
s:: 
QJ 
() 
s:: 
0 
1.6 () 
s:: 
0 
.0 
H 
ro 
1.2 () 0 
H 
'd 
» 
.r:: 
. 8 'd s:: 
ro 
QJ-
'd 
.4 .... >< 0 
.... 
'd 
s:: 
0 0 
.0 
H 
ro 
() 
2 . 0 
s::-
QJ 
tj) 
~ 
0 
1.6 
1.2 
. 8 
. 4 
0 
~ / CxH;_ 
-
""" 
I I \ /' ~ Ico \ / 
"', 
........ I A 
~ 
'----r- J v ./ 
16 
12 
VV "'-~ V 
",""--f) Q v 1\ \ cO2 
'" 
~ 
V V >- ~ V V \ \ ~ CxHy_ 
./ /' / \ / \ \ - N 
8 
4 
.7 p '-. N ,/ I.--- co and 02 limi t o 
F~rwJd Jab1~ 11 4 . 2 
"" 
II I ..D-o n,. ........-- -0. 
20 
"n. 02 C02 limit \ / 
....... 4 !\ \ / '0" 
16 
12 \ V / \ J / \ 1 / VI t -...j \ ~ 
co/' V '-....! l¥' '\ 
8 
/' / / 0r Q.. ~ ~ ~ 1">_ CxHy _ V --, A 
" 
~o. 
--- '\1 V / 
-
'--d 
4 
V -<7 -4 co and 02 limit~ ""-.. ~ h o 
"A)t CfbiJ 
-T Nl es~ape t i Le limi~s Jea,c~ed 
~ 20 
rn--°Z / /-' 
~ / 
16 
"" 
"'\ / 
-
0 
12 
I\, ~ ~ \ 
cO 2 .c/ t;1 'ri f\ CO 
8 
./ 
,P- /' I \ ~ CxHy ...0. 
/>. ~ -<>-- / / i ~ \ ~ ..{:l 
-
"-
4 
v--r--~ v-: / 
"" 
../ -0 ~ ~ 
o 60 120 180 240 300 360 420 480 540 600 
Time , sec 
(a) Hulk fire number 1 . 
Figure 21 . - Time histories of gas concentra tions at various positions in 
burning airplane hulks. 
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(b) Hulk fire number 2 . 
Figure 21 . - Concluded . Time histories of gas concentrations at 
various positions in burning airplane hulks . 
9E 
... 
NACA TN 2996 
~ 
C-33012 
Figure 22. - Flame from explosion of hydrocarbon vapor in fuselage escaping
 through 
forward fuselage door. 
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(a) Crash 1; low midwing airplane. 
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(b) Crash 3; low midwing airplane. 
Figure 23 . - Time histories of escape possibility from various 
~uarters of several transport airplanes involved in crash 
fire. 
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(c) Crash 6; hi gh wi ng airplane. 
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(d) Crash 7; high wing airplane. 
Figure 23 . - Concluded. Time histories of escape possibility 
from various quarters of several transport airplanes involved 
in crash fire. 
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a) Escape avenue to right rear of airplane open approximately 30 se conds after 
impact and after fuel mi st flasb fire had burned away; wind from r i gbt r ear; 
crash 1. 
(b) Escape avenue to left front; wind from left rear quarter, variable at 0 to 5 miles 
per bour; crasb 3 " 
Figure 24. - Escape avenues . 
NACA TN 2996 
(c) Escape avenue to left rear after major part of spilled fuel · had burned away; wind 
from left rear, 0 to 5 miles per bour; crasb 3 . 
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Cd) Escape avenue to rigbt front; winer from rigbt rear, 13 to 16 miles per bour; crasb 6. 
Figure 24 . - Continued. Escape avenues. 
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(e) Escape avenue to rigbt rear after fuel mist fire burned away; wind fram right rear, 10 to 15 miles per bour; crasb 7 . 
Figure 24 . - Concluded . Escape a venues . 
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Figure 25 . - Typical damage to steel propeller blade caused by impact with crasb barrier. 
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a Flying propeller blades 
b Slashes cut in fuselage by blades 
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Figure 26 . - Typical example of damage to fuselage by flying propeller blades. 
, 
a 
o 
~ 
C-28159 
-J 
N 
s; 
~ 
~ 
N 
<.0 
<.0 
m 
10E NACA TN 2996 73 
Figure 27. - Section of broken forged aluminum propeller blade caused by impRct of blade 
witb an obstacle . 
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Figure 28 . - Typical damage caused by flying fragments of forged aluminum propeller 
blades . 
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(a) Penetration by steel propeller blades during four crashes . 
Figure 29. - Penetration of fuselage by propeller fragments . 
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(b) Penetration by forged aluminum propeller fragments 
during 14 cra shes. 
Figure 29 . - Conclu ded . Penetration of fuselage by propeller 
fragments . 
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Figure 30 . - Hole made in floor when front landing-gear strut and guide slipper 
were detached by contact with obstacle at crasb barrier and penetrated floor 
structure. 
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Figure 31 . - Position of front landing-wheel strut after penetrating floor and rebound-
ing from rear of cabin. 
Figure 32 . - Damage resulting when front landing-gear structure penetrates floor . 
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[i'igUJ"e 33. - Destruction of front landing-gear bulkhea.d and structure. Proximity to dummy shows 
possibility of injury to occupants seated in front part of fuselage. 
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1 (a) Ignition 42 seconds after impact. 
Figure 34 . - Wing explosion resulting from ignition of fuel-air mixture accumulated in wing while airplane was 
sliding to a sto~. 
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(b) Rear view of damage to wing structure. C·28 15 
Figure 34. - Continued . Wing explosion resulting from ignition of fuel-air mixture accumulated in wing while airplane 
was s l iding to a stop . 
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-(c) Front view of damage to wing structure. 
Figure 34 . - Concluded. Wing explosion resulting from ignition of fuel-air mixture accumulated in wing while airplane 
was sliding to a stop . 
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Figure 35 . - Wing damage resulting from internal explosion that occurred several minutes after original fire was 
in progress. Explosion caused by ignition of fuel-air mixture trapped in wing. 
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Figure 36. - Damage resulting when hydraulic shock strut was heated by aircraft fire 
and exploded . 
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figure 37 . - Fragment of hydraulic shock strut cylinder found 150 feet from airplane 
after shock strut exploded because of fire . 
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Figure 38 . - Insignificant damage to floor structure of low-midwing, twin-engine type aircraft resulting from simulated 
take-off accident. Cabin floor lies along indented joint line between two curved sections of fuselage . 
en 
m 
~ 
o 
:x> 
~ 
[\) 
tD 
tD 
m 
NACA TN 2996 
connecting side 
freme and floor 
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rotated from 
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Figure 39 . - Damage to packet- type cargo airplane floor structure and side framing 
resulting from vertical impact and sliding friction on bard ground surface . 
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Figure 40. - Floor support structure of cargo-type airplane bulged sligbtly upward as a result of nose-wbeel damage and 
l anding impact upon bard dirt surface. 
OJ 
OJ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
I:\) 
I.D 
I.D 
m 
Wigure 41. - Fl our structure of ca rgu- cype airpl ane sever ely damaged and bulged upward as a result of nose- wbee l damage 
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o 0 Figure 42 . - Corner bent rotated from 90 to about 120 from its normal position by combined lateral and vertical forces 
caused by ground l oop . 
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(a) Side members separated from ceiling members . 
Figure 43 . - Incipient lateral collapse of rectangular-tJIle fuselage framing from 1a teral lead ilnposed by ground-loor 
cras h . 
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(b) Buckling and shearing of vertical wall members. 
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:figure 43. - Continued. Incipient lateral collapse of rectangular-type fuselage framing resulting from lateral load 
imposed by ground-loop crasb. 
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(c) BUCKling of side frame structure. 
Figure 43. - Continued. Incipient lateral collapse of rectangular-type fuselage framing resulting from lateral loae 
imposed by ground-loop crasb. 
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(d) Fractured connection between side frame and ceiling members . 
Figure 43. - Continued. Incipient lateral collapse of rectangular-type fuselage framing resulting from lateral load 
imposed by ground-loop crasb . 
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(e) Side of fuselage bulged. 
igure 43. - Concluded. Incipient lateral collapse of rectangular-type fuselage framlng resulting from lateral loac 
imposed by ground-loop crasb. 
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Figure 44 . - Diagram showing temperature of human skin resulting from absorption of heat shown by 
ordinat e during time interval shown by absciss a . (Diagram based on data from refs . 4 and 15.) 
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Figure 45. - Differences in heat absorption by human a~ pig skin attributable t o perspiration. 
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Figure 46. - Diagram for determining carbon monoxide absorption factor for a subject 
doing light work in various oxygen concentrations. (Based upon data presented in 
ref. 8 .) 
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